First Atomic Bombs Little Boy And Fat Man
Little Boy
Little Boy was the codename of the atomic bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima, on August 6, 1945 by the 12-man crew of the B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay, piloted by Colonel Paul Tibbets of the United States Army Air Forces. It was the first atomic bomb ever used as a weapon and was dropped three days before the "Fat Man" bomb was used against Nagasaki.The weapon was developed during the Manhattan Project during World War II. It derived its explosive power from the nuclear fissioning of enriched uranium. The Hiroshima bombing was the second man-made nuclear explosion in history (the first was the "Trinity" test), and it was the first uranium-based detonation ever. Approximately 600 milligrams of mass were converted into energy. It exploded with a destructive power equivalent to between 13 and 16 kilotons of TNT (estimates vary) and killed approximately 140,000 people including associated effects.
Basic weapon design
The Mk I "Little Boy" was 10 feet (3 m) in length, 28 inches (71 cm) in diameter and weighed 8,900 lb (4000 kg). The design used the gun method to explosively force a hollow sub-critical mass of uranium-235 and a solid target spike together into a super-critical mass, initiating a nuclear chain reaction. This was accomplished by simply shooting one piece of the uranium onto the other by means of chemical explosives. It contained 64 kg of uranium, of which 0.7 kg underwent nuclear fission, and of this mass only 0.6 g became energy.
No full test of a gun-type nuclear weapon had occurred before the "Little Boy" device was dropped over Hiroshima. The only test explosion of a nuclear weapon had been of an implosion-type weapon utilizing plutonium as its fissionable material, on July 16, 1945 at the Trinity test. There were several reasons for not testing the "Little Boy" device. Primarily, scarcity of uranium-235 compared with the relatively large amount of plutonium which, it was expected, could be produced monthly from the Hanford reactors. Additionally, the weapon design was conceptually simple enough that it was only deemed necessary to do laboratory tests with the gun-type assembly (known during the war as "tickling the dragon's tail"). Unlike the implosion design, which required very sophisticated coordination of shaped explosive charges, the gun-type design was considered almost certain to work without full testing.
Although occasionally used in later experimental devices, the design was only used once as a weapon because of the extreme danger of accidental detonation. Little Boy's design was highly unsafe when compared to modern nuclear weapons, which incorporate many different safety features embedded in them, designed to anticipate various accident scenarios. The main design objectives of Little Boy were to create a nuclear weapon that was absolutely guaranteed to work. As a result, Little Boy incorporated only the most basic safety mechanisms, so an accidental detonation could easily occur during one or more of the following scenarios:
a simple crash could drive the "bullet" onto the "target" resulting in a massive release of radiation, or possibly nuclear detonation.
an electrical short circuit of some sort.
the danger of misfire was even greater over water. Even if the force of a crash did not trigger the bomb, the resulting leakage of water into the unprotected system could short it out, again possibly leading to accidental detonation. The British Red Beard nuclear weapon also suffered from this design flaw.
Fire.
Lightning strike.
None of the other five Mark I bombs built on the model of Little Boy were used by the US Army.
Assembly details
The exact specifications of the "Little Boy" bomb remain classified because they can still be used to create a viable nuclear weapon. Even so, many sources have speculated as to the design, relying on limited photographic evidence, interviews with former Manhattan Project personnel, and piecing together information from declassified sources to reconstruct its internal dimensions.
According to one source considered reliable,[1] inside the weapon, the uranium-235 material was divided into two parts, following the gun principle: the "projectile" and the "target". The projectile was a hollow cylinder with 60% of the total mass (38.5 kg). It consisted of a stack of 9 uranium rings, each 6.25 inches in diameter with a 4-inch-diameter hole in the middle, pressed together into a thin-walled canister 7 inches long. At detonation, it would be pushed down a short section of smooth-bore gun barrel by a tungsten-carbide and steel plug. The target was a 4-inch-diameter solid spike, 7 inches long, with 40% of the total mass (25.6 kg). Made of a stack of 6 washer-like uranium rings somewhat thicker than the projectile rings, it was held in place by a 1-inch-diameter steel bolt that ran through the rings and out the front end of the bomb casing.
When the projectile and plug reached the target, the assembled super-critical mass of uranium would be completely surrounded by a tamper and neutron reflector of tungsten-carbide and steel. Neutron generators at the base of the spike would be activated by the impact.
The projectile rings were delivered to Tinian Island on July 26, 1945, by the cruiser USS Indianapolis. The target rings arrived two days later by air.

Development of the bomb

The "Little Boy" bomb was constructed through the massive Manhattan Project during World War II. Because enriched uranium was known to be fissionable, it was the first approach to bomb development pursued (plutonium was, when the project began, still undiscovered). The vast majority of the work in constructing "Little Boy" came in the form of the isotope enrichment of the uranium necessary for the weapon. Enrichment at Oak Ridge, Tennessee began in February 1943, after many years of research.
The development of the first prototypes and the experimental work started during the spring of 1943, at the time when the Los Alamos Design Laboratory became operational in the framework of the Manhattan Project. Originally gun-type designs were pursued for both a uranium and plutonium weapon (the "Thin Man" design), but in April 1944 it was discovered that the spontaneous fission rate for plutonium from the Hanford enrichment plant was too high to use in a gun-type weapon. In July 1944, almost all research at Los Alamos re-oriented around the development of the implosion plutonium weapon. In contrast, the uranium bomb was almost trivial to design.

With plutonium found unsuitable for the gun-type design, the team working on the gun weapon (led by A. Francis Birch), faced another problem: the bomb was simple, but they lacked the quantity of uranium-235 necessary for its production. Enough fissile material was not going to be available before mid-1945. Despite this, Birch managed to convince others that this concept was worth pursuing, and that in case of a failure of the plutonium bomb, it would still be possible to use the gun principle. His team had heavy responsibilities and even though the technology was less complex than for the other project, a lot of rigorous work was still needed. In February 1945, the specifications were completed (model 1850). The bomb, except for the uranium payload, was ready at the beginning of May, 1945.
Most of the uranium necessary for the production of the bomb came from the Shinkolobwe mine and was made available thanks to the foresight of the CEO of the High Katanga Mining Union, Edgar Sengier, who had 1000 tons of uranium ore transported to a New York warehouse in 1939. The majority of the uranium for Little Boy was enriched in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, primarily by means of electromagnetic separation in calutrons and through gaseous diffusion plants, with a small amount contributed by the cyclotrons at Ernest O. Lawrence's Radiation Laboratory. The core of Little Boy contained 64 kg of uranium, of which 50 kg were enriched to 89%, and the remaining 14 kg at 50%. With enrichment averaging 80%, it could reach about 2.5 critical masses. "Fat Man" and the Trinity "gadget", by way of comparison, had five critical masses.
Construction and delivery

On July 14, 1945 a train left Los Alamos carrying several "bomb units" (the major non-nuclear parts of a gun-type bomb) together with a single completed uranium projectile; the uranium target was still incomplete. The consignment was delivered to the San Francisco Naval Shipyard at Hunters Point in San Francisco, California[1]. There, two hours before the successful test of Little Boy's plutonium-implosion brother at the Trinity test in New Mexico, the bomb units and the projectile were loaded aboard the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis. Indianapolis steamed, at a record pace, to the airbase at Tinian island in the Mariana Islands, delivering them ten days later on the 26th. While returning from this mission Indianapolis was sunk by a Japanese submarine, with great loss of life due to shark attacks. Also on the 26th the three sections of the uranium target assembly were shipped from Kirtland Air Force Base[1] near Albuquerque, New Mexico in three C-54 Skymaster aircraft operated by the 509th Composite Group's Green Hornet squadron[2] [3]. With all the necessary components delivered to Tinian, bomb unit L11 was chosen, and the final Little Boy weapon was assembled and ready by August 1[1].
Handling the completed Little Boy was particularly dangerous. Once cordite was loaded in the breech, any firing of the explosive would at worst cause a nuclear chain reaction and at best a contamination of the explosion zone. The mere contact of the two uranium masses could have caused an explosion with dire consequences, from a simple "fizzle" explosion to an explosion large enough to destroy Tinian (including the 500 B-29s based there, and their supporting infrastructure and personnel). Water was also a risk, since it could serve as a moderator between the fissile materials and cause a violent dispersal of the nuclear material. The uranium projectile could only be inserted with an apparatus that produced a force of 300,000 newtons (67,000 lbf, over 30 tons). For safety reasons, the weaponeer, Captain William Sterling Parsons, decided to load the bags of cordite only after take-off.
Fuse system
The bomb employed a fuse system worthy of a device whose total development cost was approximately $1,000,000,000 ($11 billion in 2006 dollars) to build, and was designed to detonate at the most destructive altitude. Calculations showed that for the largest destructive effect, the bomb should explode at an altitude of 580 meters. The resultant fuse design was a three-stage interlock system:
A timer ensured that the bomb would not explode until at least fifteen seconds after release. The timer then passed on responsibility to a barometric stage.
The purpose of the barometric stage was to delay activating the final radar altimeter fuse until the bomb was far enough from the airplane that the radar fuze, which was originally developed to warn bombers of approaching fighters, would not detonate the bomb prematurely. A thin metallic membrane was gradually deformed as ambient air pressure naturally increased during descent. The barometric fuse was not in itself considered accurate enough to be used to detonate the bomb at the precise ignition height, because air pressure varies moment-to-moment with local weather conditions. When the bomb reached the design height for this stage (reportedly 2,000 meters) the membrane closed a circuit, activating the final ground radar altimeter fuse. The barometric stage was added because of a real worry that radar signals from external sources might detonate the bomb too early to be effective.
The doubly-redundant radar system employed four radar altimeters that independently detected altitude directly from radar reflections off the ground. When any two of the four altimeters sensed the correct height, the firing switch closed, igniting the cordite charge. This launched the uranium projectile towards the other end of the gun barrel at an eventual muzzle velocity of ~300 meters per second. Approximately 10 milliseconds later the chain reaction took place, lasting less than 1 μs.
The bombing of Hiroshima

The bomb was armed in flight 9600 m (31,000 feet) above the city, then dropped at approximately 8:15 a.m. (JST). The detonation happened at an altitude of 580 m (1900 feet). With a power of 13 to 16 kilotons (estimations vary), it was less powerful than "Fat Man," which was dropped on Nagasaki (21–23 kt). The official yield estimate of "Little Boy" was about 15 kilotons of TNT equivalent in explosive force, i.e. 6.3 × 1013 joules = 63 TJ (terajoules)[4]. However, the damage and the number of victims at Hiroshima were much higher, as Hiroshima was on flat terrain, while the hypocenter of Nagasaki lay in a small valley.
Approximately 70,000 people were killed as a direct result of the blast, and a similar number were injured. A great number more would later die as a result of nuclear fallout and cancer.[5] Unborn babies died or were born with deformities.[6]
The success of the bombing was reported with great enthusiasm in the United States. See Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for discussion of contemporary opposition to the bombings, on both moral and military grounds.
Possible Nazi origins of uranium
It has been assumed that most of the uranium enriched for the bomb came from the Shinkolobwe mine in what was then the Belgian Congo, operated by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, whose Director-General, Edgar Sengier had sent a stock of the element to New York for the Manhattan Project. He was later awarded the Presidential Medal for Merit for his aid to the victory of the Allies. Other uranium came from sources in the United States (especially the Four Corners region), and from Port Radium, Canada.
However, several historians have conjectured that some of the source uranium used for the "Little Boy" or (after conversion to plutonium) the "Fat Man" bombs may actually have been produced in Nazi Germany. Uranium was reportedly secured by Manhattan Project scientific director Robert Oppenheimer from the surrendering German submarine U-234. The German U-boat had been on its way to deliver the uranium and other top secret German warfare technology to the then Empire of Japan. U-234 surrendered following the end of hostilities in the European war theater and Germany's unconditional surrender and was led on May 19, 1945 to Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Two Japanese military officials on board the German vessel committed suicide and were buried at sea.[7]
There are conflicting assessments of the importance of the German material to the Manhattan Project. The German uranium was likely to have been unenriched uranium oxide which would have yielded a small fraction of the amount of fissionable material used in the "Little Boy": it is estimated that with technology available at the time, it was possible to obtain 4 kg of enriched uranium out of 560 kg of uranium oxide. Compare this to the 64 kg of uranium used in "Little Boy". While it is possible that the uranium could have been added into the overall Manhattan Project materials development effort, as Lt. Col. John Lansdale, Jr., head of Manhattan Project intelligence and security said years later,[8] it would have only added a relatively small amount of material to either of the bombs, making its final disposition ironic but not essential.
Conversely, if the uranium was fully enriched, it would have been over eight times as much enriched uranium than had been developed by the U.S. during the Manhattan Project, and it seems unlikely that Germany would be exporting enough material to make a number of nuclear weapons to Japan, especially since their own nuclear program is known to have been a failure. Furthermore, Japan had only 50 scientists working on its atomic bomb program and no known means of enriching uranium as the United States did at Oak Ridge.
Between 240 and 340 tons of uranium oxide were recovered from Germany for use in the Soviet nuclear program, however—the head Soviet scientist on the effort, Igor Kurchatov, said that it sped up the development of their first experimental nuclear reactor by at least a year, as the Soviet Union had very poor uranium reserves at the time.
Fat Man

"Fat Man" is the codename of the atomic bomb that was detonated over Nagasaki, Japan, by the United States on August 9, 1945. It was the 2nd of the two nuclear weapons to be used in warfare. The name also refers more generically to the early nuclear weapon designs of U.S. weapons based on the "Fat Man" model. It was an implosion-type weapon with a plutonium core.
"Fat Man" was detonated at an altitude of about 1,800 feet (550 m) over the city, and was dropped from a B-29 bomber Bockscar, piloted by Major Charles Sweeney. The bomb had a yield of about 21 kilotons of TNT, or 8.78×1013 joules = 88 TJ (terajoules).[1] Because of Nagasaki's hilly terrain, the damage was somewhat less extensive than that in relatively flat Hiroshima. An estimated 40,000 people were killed outright by the bombing at Nagasaki, and about 25,000 were injured.[2] Many thousands more would die later from related injuries, and radiation sickness from nuclear fallout.
Technology

The weapon was 10 feet 8 inches (3.25 m) long, five feet (1.52 m) in diameter, and weighed 10,200 pounds (4,630 kg). In accordance with the name, it was more than twice as wide as Little Boy, which was dropped on Hiroshima three days earlier; however, the mass was only 10% more.
"Fat Man" was an implosion-type weapon using plutonium. A subcritical sphere of plutonium was placed in the center of a hollow sphere of high explosive. Numerous detonators located on the surface of the high explosive were fired simultaneously to produce a powerful inward pressure on the core, squeezing it and increasing its density, resulting in a supercritical condition and a nuclear explosion.
The difficulty in the design lay primarily in properly compressing the plutonium core into a near-perfect sphere; if the compression was not symmetrical it would cause the plutonium to be simply ejected from the weapon, making it an inefficient and un-impressive "dirty bomb". In order to accomplish the compression, the high-explosive system had to be carefully designed as a series of explosive lenses which used alternating fast- and slow-burning explosives to shape the explosive shockwave into the desired spherical shape. An early idea of this sort had been raised by physicist Richard Tolman during early discussions of possible bomb designs, though Seth Neddermeyer is credited for developing the idea further. The idea of using shaped charges came from mathematician John von Neumann, and both he and George Kistiakowsky eventually ended up being the principal architects behind the lens system. Robert Christy is generally credited with the insight that a solid subcritical sphere of Plutonium could be compressed to a critical state greatly simplifying the task since earlier efforts had attempted the more difficult compression of shapes like spherical shells. Because Christy's insight made the feasibility of a Plutonium bomb much more likely, the weapon tested at Alamagordo and used at Nagasaki is sometimes referred to as the "Christy Gadget."

At first it was thought that two pieces of subcritical plutonium (Pu-239) could simply be shot into one another to create a nuclear explosion, and a plutonium gun-type design of this sort (known as the "Thin Man" bomb) was worked on for some time during the Manhattan Project. However in April 1944 it was discovered that plutonium created for the bomb in the nuclear reactors at Hanford, Washington—even though it was supergrade weapon plutonium containing only about 0.9% Pu-240—was not as pure as the initial samples of plutonium developed at the cyclotrons at Ernest O. Lawrence's Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley, California. Because of the presence of the isotope Pu-240, reactor-bred plutonium had a much higher rate of spontaneous neutron emission than was previously thought, and if a gun-type device was used it would most likely pre-detonate and result in a messy and costly "fizzle." The spontaneous fission rate of Pu-240 is 415,000 fissions/(s·kg), and the amount was 0.9% of 6.2 kg, is 56 g. Thus there were 23,000 spontaneous fissions per second. This means that the last few centimeters would have to be travelled in preferably much less than 40 microseconds.
It is theoretically possible to build a plutonium gun-type device, but it would need to be 19 feet long in order to accelerate the subcritical masses sufficiently to be fused into a critical mass before a fizzle occurs. The mass of a plutonium gun-type device would have been beyond the payload of the B-29.
After this problem was realized, the entire Los Alamos laboratory re-organized around the problem of the implosion bomb, the "Fat Man" starting in June 1944.
The gun-type method could still be used for highly enriched uranium, though, and was employed in the "Little Boy" weapon, which was used against Hiroshima, Japan. For a variety of reasons, the implosion method is both more efficient than the gun-type method, and also far safer, as a perfect synchronization of the explosion lenses is required for the core to properly detonate, greatly reducing the chances of an accidental nuclear detonation.

Because of its complicated firing mechanism, and the need for previously untested synchronization of explosives and precision design, it was felt that a full test of the concept was needed before the scientists and military representatives could be confident it would perform correctly under combat conditions. On July 16, 1945, a device utilizing a similar mechanism (called the "gadget" for security reasons) detonated in a test explosion at a remote site in New Mexico, known as the "Trinity" test. In the end, it gave somewhere around 20 kt (80 TJ), 2 to 4 times the expected yield.
The Soviet Union's first nuclear weapon detonated at Operation First Lightning (known as "Joe 1" in the West) was more or less a purposeful copy of the "Fat Man" device, on which they had obtained detailed information from the spy Klaus Fuchs.
The names for all three projects ("Fat Man", "Thin Man", and "Little Boy") were created by Robert Serber, a former student of Los Alamos director Robert Oppenheimer's who worked on the project. According to his later memoirs, he chose them based on their design shapes; the "Thin Man" would be a very long device, and the name came from the Dashiell Hammett detective novel and series of movies by the same name; the "Fat Man" bomb would be round and fat and was named after Sidney Greenstreet's character in The Maltese Falcon. "Little Boy" would come last and be named only to contrast to the "Thin Man" bomb.[3]
Interior of bomb
The original blueprints of the interior of both Fat Man and Little Boy are still classified. However, much information about the main parts is available in the unclassified public literature. Of particular interest is a description of Fat Man sent to Moscow by Soviet spies at Los Alamos in 1945. It was released by the Russian government in 1992.[4]
Below is a diagram of the main parts of the "Fat Man" bomb itself, followed by a more detailed look at the different materials used in the physics package of the bomb (the part responsible for the nuclear detonation).

1) AN 219 contact fuse (four)
2) Archie radar antenna
3) Plate with batteries (to detonate charge surrounding nuclear components)
4) X-Unit, a firing set placed near the charge
5) Hinge fixing the two ellipsoidal parts of the bomb
6) Physics package (see details below)
7) Plate with instruments (radars, baroswitches and timers)
8) Barotube collector
9) California Parachute tail assembly (.20-inch aluminum sheet)

Assembly

To allow insertion of the plutonium pit as late as possible in the bomb's assembly, the spherical U-238 tamper had a 4" diameter cylindrical hole running through it, like the hole in a cored apple. The missing cylinder, containing the plutonium pit, could be slipped in through a hole in the surrounding aluminum pusher.
To allow insertion of the plutonium pit as late as possible in the bomb's assembly, the spherical U-238 tamper had a 4" diameter cylindrical hole running through it, like the hole in a cored apple. The missing cylinder, containing the plutonium pit, could be slipped in through a hole in the surrounding aluminum pusher.

In 2003, these concentric spheres and cylinder were recreated as the centerpiece of an art installation called "Critical Assembly" by sculptor Jim Sanborn. Using non-nuclear materials, he replicated the internal components of the "Trinity" bomb, which had the same design as Fat Man. Critical Assembly was first displayed at the Corcoran Gallery of Art, in Washington, DC.[5]
Detonation sequence
The plutonium must be compressed to twice its normal density before free neutrons are added to start the fission chain reaction:
An exploding-bridgewire detonator simultaneously starts a detonation wave in each of the 32 tapered high explosive columns (12 pentagonal and 20 hexagonal - in the pattern of a soccer ball skin).
The detonation wave (arrows) is initially convex in the
faster explosive, Composition B: 60% RDX, 39% TNT, 1% wax. Its shape becomes concave in the
slower explosive (Baratol). The 32 waves merge into a single spherical implosive wave before they hit the
faster explosive, Composition B, of the inner charges.
The medium-density aluminum "pusher" transitions the imploding shock wave from low-density explosive to high-density uranium, minimizing undesirable turbulence; the shock wave then compresses the inner components. At the very center, the

beryllium–polonium-210 "initiator" (the "urchin") is crushed, bringing the two metals in contact to release a burst of neutrons into the compressed
"pit" of plutonium-239–plutonium-240–gallium delta-phase alloy (96%–1%–3% by molarity). A fission chain reaction starts. The tendency of the fissioning pit to prematurely blow itself apart is retarded by the inward momentum of the
natural-uranium "tamper" (inertial containment). The tamper also reflects neutrons back into the pit, speeding up the chain reaction.
The boron plastic shell was intended to protect the pit from stray neutrons, but was later deemed unnecessary.
The result is the fissioning of about two and a half of the thirteen pounds of plutonium in the pit, and the release of twenty-one kilotons of energy (21,000 tons of TNT).
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuclear attacks during World War II against the Empire of Japan by the United States of America under US President Harry S. Truman. On August 6 1945, the nuclear weapon "Little Boy" was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, followed on August 9, 1945 by the detonation of the "Fat Man" nuclear bomb over Nagasaki. They are the only instances of the use of nuclear weapons in warfare.
The United States Department of Energy estimates that, at Hiroshima, the death toll from the immediate blast was roughly 70,000, with additional deaths occuring in the time soon after the explosion and in the decades that followed.[1][2][3][4] The figures for Nagasaki are slightly less.[5] Other estimates vary widely,[6][7][8] and are as low as 74,000 for Nagasaki.[9] In both cities, the overwhelming majority of the deaths were civilians.
The role of the bombings in Japan's surrender, as well as the effects and justification of them, has been subject to much debate.
On August 15, 1945 Japan announced its surrender to the Allied Powers, signing the Instrument of Surrender on September 2 which officially ended World War II. Furthermore, the experience of bombing led post-war Japan to adopt Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which forbids Japan from nuclear armament.
The Manhattan Project

The United States, with assistance from the United Kingdom and Canada, designed and built the first atomic bombs under what was called the Manhattan Project. The project was initially started at the instigation of European refugee scientists (including Albert Einstein) and American scientists who feared that Nazi Germany would also be conducting a full-scale bomb development program (that program was later discovered to be much smaller and further behind). The project itself eventually employed over 130,000 people at its peak at over thirty institutions spread over the United States, and cost a total of nearly US$2 billion, making it one of the largest and most costly research and development programs of all time.
The first nuclear device, called "Gadget," was detonated during the "Trinity" test near Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 16, 1945. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were the second and third to be detonated and as of 2007 the only ones ever detonated in a military action. (See Weapons of Mass Destruction.)
During World War II both the Allies and Axis powers had previously pursued policies of strategic bombing and the targeting of civilian infrastructure. In numerous cases these had caused huge numbers of civilian casualties and were (or came to be) controversial. In Germany, the Allied firebombing of Dresden resulted in roughly 30,000 deaths. The March 194 firebombing of Tokyo killed 72,489 people, according to the Japan War History office.[10] By August, about 60 Japanese cities had been destroyed through a massive aerial campaign, including massive firebombing raids on the cities of Tokyo and Kobe.
Over 3½ years of direct U.S. involvement in World War II, approximately 290,000 Americans had been killed in action and another 110,000 killed as a result of the war,[11] 90,000 of them incurred in the war against Japan.[12] In the months prior to the bombings, the Battle of Okinawa resulted in American casualties of 49,151.[13] The Japanese deathtoll was given as 107,539 counted dead plus an estimated 23,764 in the closed caves or buried by the Japanese. Since the number was far above the estimated Japanese force on the island the army intelligence supposed that about 42,000 were civilians.[14] A commonly provided justification for the bombings is that an invasion of the Japanese mainland was expected to result in casualties many times greater than in Okinawa.
U.S. President Harry S. Truman was unaware of the Manhattan Project until Franklin Roosevelt's death. Truman asked U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to head a group of prominent citizens called the Interim Committee, which included three respected scientists and had been set up to advise the President on the military, political, and scientific questions raised by the possible use of the first atomic bomb. On May 31, Stimson put his conclusions to the committee and a four-man Scientific Panel. Stimson supported use of the bomb, stating "Our great task is to bring this war to a prompt and successful conclusion." But Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the Scientific Panel members, stated that a single atomic bomb would probably kill twenty thousand people, and the target should be a military one, not civilian. Another scientist, Dr. Arthur Holly Compton, suggested dropping the bomb on an isolated part of Japan to demonstrate its power while minimizing civilian deaths. But this was soon dismissed, since if Japan was to be notified in advance of an attack, the bomber might be shot down; alternately, the first bomb might fail to detonate.[15]
In early July, on the way to Potsdam, Truman re-examined the decision to use the bomb. In the end, Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan. His stated intention in ordering the bombings was to bring about a quick resolution of the war by inflicting destruction, and instilling fear of further destruction, that was sufficient to cause Japan to surrender.
On July 26, Truman and other allied leaders issued The Potsdam Declaration outlining terms of surrender for Japan:
"...The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland..."
"...We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
The atomic bomb was still a highly guarded secret and was not mentioned in the declaration. On July 28, Japanese papers reported that the declaration had been rejected by the Japanese government. That afternoon, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki declared at a press conference that the Potsdam Declaration was no more than a rehash (yakinaoshi) of the Cairo Declaration and that the government intended to ignore it (mokusatsu).[16] The statement was taken by both Japanese and foreign papers as a clear rejection of the declaration. Emperor Hirohito, who was waiting for a Soviet reply to noncommittal Japanese peace feelers, made no move to change the government position.[17] On July 31, he made clear to Kido that the Imperial Regalia of Japan had to be defended at all costs.[18]
Choice of targets

The Target Committee at Los Alamos on May 10–11, 1945, recommended Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and the arsenal at Kokura as possible targets. The committee rejected the use of the weapon against a strictly military objective because of the chance of missing a small target not surrounded by a larger urban area. The psychological effects on Japan were of great importance to the committee members. They also agreed that the initial use of the weapon should be sufficiently spectacular for its importance to be internationally recognized. The committee felt Kyoto, as an intellectual center of Japan, had a population "better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon." Hiroshima was chosen because of its large size, its being "an important army depot" and the potential that the bomb would cause greater destruction because the city was surrounded by hills which would have a "focusing effect".[19]
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson struck Kyoto from the list because of its cultural significance, over the objections of General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project. According to Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Stimson "had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlier." On July 25 General Carl Spaatz was ordered to bomb one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki as soon after August 3 as weather permitted and the remaining cities as additional weapons became available.[20]
Hiroshima
Hiroshima during World War II
At the time of its bombing, Hiroshima was a city of some industrial and military significance. A number of military camps were located nearby, including the headquarters of the Fifth Division and Field Marshal Shunroku Hata's 2nd General Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. Hiroshima was a minor supply and logistics base for the Japanese military. The city was a communications center, a storage point, and an assembly area for troops. It was one of several Japanese cities left deliberately untouched by American bombing, allowing an ideal environment to measure the damage caused by the atomic bomb. Another account stresses that after General Spaatz reported that Hiroshima was the only targeted city without prisoner of war (POW) camps, Washington decided to assign it highest priority.
The center of the city contained several reinforced concrete buildings and lighter structures. Outside the center, the area was congested by a dense collection of small wooden workshops set among Japanese houses. A few larger industrial plants lay near the outskirts of the city. The houses were of wooden construction with tile roofs, and many of the industrial buildings also were of wood frame construction. The city as a whole was highly susceptible to fire damage.
The population of Hiroshima had reached a peak of over 381,000 earlier in the war, but prior to the atomic bombing the population had steadily decreased because of a systematic evacuation ordered by the Japanese government. At the time of the attack the population was approximately 255,000. This figure is based on the registered population used by the Japanese in computing ration quantities, and the estimates of additional workers and troops who were brought into the city may be inaccurate.
The bombing
Hiroshima was the primary target of the first nuclear bombing mission on August 6, with Kokura and Nagasaki being alternative targets. August 6 was chosen because there had previously been cloud over the target. The B-29 Enola Gay, piloted and commanded by 509th Composite Group commander Colonel Paul Tibbets, was launched from North Field airbase on Tinian in the West Pacific, about six hours flight time from Japan. The Enola Gay (named after Colonel Tibbets' mother) was accompanied by two other B29s, The Great Artiste which carried instrumentation, commanded by Major Charles W. Sweeney, and a then-nameless aircraft later called Necessary Evil (the photography aircraft) commanded by Captain George Marquardt.[21}

After leaving Tinian the aircraft made their way separately to Iwo Jima where they rendezvoused at 2440 m (8000 ft) and set course for Japan. The aircraft arrived over the target in clear visibility at 9855 m (32,000 ft). On the journey, Navy Captain William Parsons had armed the bomb, which had been left unarmed to minimize the risks during takeoff. His assistant, 2nd Lt. Morris Jeppson, removed the safety devices 30 minutes before reaching the target area.[21]
The release at 08:15 (Hiroshima time) was uneventful, and the gravity bomb known as "Little Boy", a gun-type fission weapon with 60 kg (130 pounds) of uranium-235, took 57 seconds to fall from the aircraft to the predetermined detonation height about 600 meters (2,000 ft) above the city. It created a blast equivalent to about 13 kilotons of TNT (the U-235 weapon was considered very inefficient, with only 1.38% of its material fissioning),[22]The radius of total destruction was about 1.6 km (1 mile), with resulting fires across 11.4 km² (4.4 square miles).[23] Infrastructure damage was estimated at 90 percent of Hiroshima's buildings being either damaged or completely destroyed.

About an hour before the bombing, Japanese early warning radar detected the approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. An alert was given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima. At nearly 08:00, the radar operator in Hiroshima determined that the number of planes coming in was very small—probably not more than three—and the air raid alert was lifted. To conserve fuel and aircraft, the Japanese had decided not to intercept small formations. The normal radio broadcast warning was given to the people that it might be advisable to go to air-raid shelters if B-29s were actually sighted, but no raid was expected beyond some sort of reconnaissance.
As a result of the blast an estimated minimum 90,000 people died within two months.[24] Included in this number were about 2,000 Japanese Americans and another 800-1,000 who lived on as hibakusha, a Japanese term meaning, "explosion-affected people". As US citizens, many were attending school before the war and had been unable to leave Japan.[25] It is likely that hundreds of Allied prisoners of war also died.[26]
Japanese realization of the bombingThe Tokyo control operator of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the air. He tried to re-establish his program by using another telephone line, but it too had failed.[27] About twenty minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small railway stops within 16 kilometers (10 mi) of the city came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these reports were transmitted to the headquarters of the Japanese General Staff.
Military bases repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in Hiroshima. The complete silence from that city puzzled the men at headquarters; they knew that no large enemy raid had occurred and that no sizable store of explosives was in Hiroshima at that time. A young officer of the Japanese General Staff was instructed to fly immediately to Hiroshima, to land, survey the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was generally felt at headquarters that nothing serious had taken place and that it was all a rumor.

The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest. After flying for about three hours, while still nearly 100 miles (160 km) from Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the bomb. In the bright afternoon, the remains of Hiroshima were burning. Their plane soon reached the city, around which they circled in disbelief. A great scar on the land still burning and covered by a heavy cloud of smoke was all that was left. They landed south of the city, and the staff officer, after reporting to Tokyo, immediately began to organize relief measures.
Tokyo's first knowledge of what had really caused the disaster came from the White House public announcement in Washington, D.C., sixteen hours after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima.[28]
By August 8, 1945, newspapers in the US were reporting that broadcasts from Radio Tokyo had described the destruction observed in Hiroshima. "Practically all living things, human and animal, were literally seared to death," Japanese radio announcers said in a broadcast captured by Allied sources.[29]
Post-attack casualtiesBy December of 1945, thousands had died from their injuries and a small number from radiation poisoning, bringing the total killed in Hiroshima in 1945 to perhaps 140,000.[30] In the years between 1950 and 1990, it is statistically estimated that hundreds of deaths are attributable to radiation exposure among atomic bomb survivors from both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[31][32]
Survival of some structuresSome of the reinforced concrete buildings in Hiroshima were very strongly constructed because of the earthquake danger in Japan, and their framework did not collapse even though they were fairly close to the center of damage in the city. Akiko Takakura was among the closest survivors to the hypocenter of the blast. She had been in the strongly built Bank of Hiroshima only 300m from ground-zero at the time of the attack.[33] Since the bomb detonated in the air, the blast was more downward than sideways, which was largely responsible for the survival of the Prefectural Industrial Promotional Hall, now commonly known as the Genbaku, or A-bomb Dome designed and built by the Czech architect Jan Letzel, which was only 150 meters (490 feet) from ground zero (the hypocenter). The ruin was named Hiroshima Peace Memorial and made a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1996 over the objections of the U.S. and China.[34]
Events of August 7-9After the Hiroshima bombing, President Truman announced, "If they do not not accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth." On August 8, 1945, leaflets were dropped and warnings were given to Japan by Radio Saipan. (The area of Nagasaki did not receive warning leaflets until August 10, though the leaflet campaign covering the whole country was over a month into its operations.)[35][36]
The Japanese government still did not react to the Potsdam Declaration. Emperor Hirohito, the government and the War council were considering four conditions for surrender : the preservation of the kokutai (Imperial institution and national polity), assumption by the Imperial Headquarters of responsibility for disarmament and demobilization, no occupation and delegation to the Japanese government of the punishment of war criminals.
The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 5. At two minutes past midnight on August 9, Tokyo time, Soviet infantry, armor, and air forces launched an invasion of Manchuria. Four hours later, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army began preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Korechika Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace.
Responsibility for the timing of the second bombing was delegated to Colonel Tibbets as commander of the 509th Composite Group on Tinian. Scheduled for August 11 against Kokura, the raid was moved forward to avoid a five day period of bad weather forecast to begin on August 10.[37] Three bomb pre-assemblies had been transported to Tinian, labeled F-31, F-32, and F-33 on their exteriors. On August 8 a dress rehearsal was conducted off Tinian by Maj. Charles Sweeney using Bockscar as the drop airplane. Assembly F-33 was expended testing the components and F-31 was designated for the mission August 9.[38]
NagasakiNagasaki during World War II

The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials.
In contrast to many modern aspects of Hiroshima, the bulk of the residences were of old-fashioned Japanese construction, consisting of wood or wood-frame buildings, with wood walls (with or without plaster), and tile roofs. Many of the smaller industries and business establishments were also housed in buildings of wood or other materials not designed to withstand explosions. Nagasaki had been permitted to grow for many years without conforming to any definite city zoning plan; residences were erected adjacent to factory buildings and to each other almost as closely as possible throughout the entire industrial valley.
Nagasaki had never been subjected to large-scale bombing prior to the explosion of a nuclear weapon there. On August 1, 1945, however, a number of conventional high-explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few hit in the shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city, several hit the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works and six bombs landed at the Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, with three direct hits on buildings there. While the damage from these bombs was relatively small, it created considerable concern in Nagasaki and many people—principally school children—were evacuated to rural areas for safety, thus reducing the population in the city at the time of the nuclear attack.
To the north of Nagasaki there was a camp holding British Commonwealth prisoners of war, some of whom were working in the coal mines and only found out about the bombing when they came to the surface. At least eight known POWs died from the bombing.[39]
The bombing

On the morning of August 9, 1945, the U.S. B-29 Superfortress Bockscar, flown by the crew of 393rd Squadron commander Major Charles W. Sweeney, carried the nuclear bomb code-named "Fat Man", with Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki the secondary target. The mission plan for the second attack was nearly identical to that of the Hiroshima mission, with two B-29's flying an hour ahead as weather scouts and two additional B-29's in Sweeney's flight for instrumentation and photographic support of the mission. Sweeney took off with his weapon already armed but with the electrical safety plugs still engaged.[40]

Observers aboard the weather planes reported both targets clear. When Sweeney's aircraft arrived at the assembly point for his flight off the coast of Japan, the third plane (flown by the group's Operations Officer, Lt. Col. James I. Hopkins, Jr.) failed to make the rendezvous. Bockscar and the instrumentation plane circled for forty minutes without locating Hopkins. Already thirty minutes behind schedule, Sweeney decided to fly on without Hopkins.[40]

By the time they reached Kokura a half hour later, a 7/10 cloud cover had obscured the city, prohibiting the visual attack required by orders. After three runs over the city, and with fuel running low because a transfer pump on a reserve tank had failed before take-off, they headed for their secondary target, Nagasaki.[40] Fuel consumption calculations made en route indicated that Bockscar had insufficient fuel to reach Iwo Jima and they would be forced to divert to Okinawa. After initially deciding that if Nagasaki were obscured on their arrival they would carry the bomb to Okinawa and dispose of it in the ocean if necessary, the weaponeer Navy Commander Frederick Ashworth decided that a radar approach would be used if the target was obscured.[41]
At about 07:50 Japanese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but the "all clear" signal was given at 08:30. When only two B-29 Superfortresses were sighted at 10:53, the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given.
A few minutes later, at 11:00, the support B-29 flown by Captain Frederick C. Bock dropped instruments attached to three parachutes. These instruments also contained an unsigned letter to Professor Ryokichi Sagane, a nuclear physicist at the University of Tokyo who studied with three of the scientists responsible for the atomic bomb at the University of California, Berkeley, urging him to tell the public about the danger involved with these weapons of mass destruction. The messages were found by military authorities but not turned over to Sagane until a month later.[42] In 1949 one of the authors of the letter, Luis Alvarez, met with Sagane and signed the document.[43]

At 11:01, a last minute break in the clouds over Nagasaki allowed Bockscar's bombardier, Captain Kermit Beahan, to visually sight the target as ordered. The "Fat Man" weapon, containing a core of ~6.4 kg (14.1 lb) of plutonium-239, was dropped over the city's industrial valley. 43 seconds later it exploded 469 meters (1,540 ft) above the ground exactly halfway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works in the south and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works) in the north. This was nearly 3 kilometers (2 mi) northwest of the planned hypocenter; the blast was confined to the Urakami Valley and a major portion of the city was protected by the intervening hills.[44] The resulting explosion had a blast yield equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT. The explosion generated heat estimated at 7000 degrees Fahrenheit and winds that were estimated at 624 mph.
According to some estimates, about 70,000 of Nagasaki's 240,000 residents were killed instantly,[45] and up to 60,000 were injured. The radius of total destruction was about 1.6 km (1 mile), followed by fires across the northern portion of the city to 3.2 km (2 miles) south of the bomb.[46] The total number of residents killed may have been as many as 80,000, including the few who died from radiation poisoning in the following months.[47]
An unknown number of survivors from the Hiroshima bombing made their way to Nagasaki and were bombed again.[48][49]
Plans for more atomic attacks on Japan
The United States expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use in the third week of August, with three more in September and a further three in October.[50] On August 10, Major General Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project, sent a memorandum to General of the Army George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, in which he wrote that "the next bomb . . should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August." On the same day, Marshall endorsed the memo with the comment, "It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President."[50] There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs in production until Operation Downfall, the projected invasion of Japan, had begun. "The problem now [13 August] is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, to continue dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether to hold them . . . and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the target that we are after. In other words, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, and the like? Nearer the tactical use rather than other use."[50]
The surrender of Japan and the U.S. occupation
Up to August 9, the War council was still insisting on its four conditions for surrender. On that day Hirohito ordered Kido to "quickly control the situation" "because Soviet Union has declared war against us". He then held an Imperial conference during which he authorized minister Togo to notify the Allies that Japan would accept their terms on one condition, that the declaration "does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler".[51]
On August 12, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied "of course".[52] As the Allied terms seemed to leave intact the principle of the preservation of the Throne, Hirohito recorded on August 14 his capitulation announcement which was broadcast to the Japanese nation the next day despite a short rebellion by fanatic militarists opposed to the surrender.
In his declaration, Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings :
“
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.
”
However, in his "Rescript to the soldiers and sailors" delivered on 17 August, he stressed the impact of the Soviet invasion and his decision to surrender, omitting any mention of the bombs.
During the year after the bombing, approximately 40,000 U.S. occupation troops were in Hiroshima. Nagasaki was occupied by 27,000 troops.[53] Upper limit dose estimates[clarify] for those troops range from 0.19–0.3 mSv for Hiroshima and from 0.8–6.3 mSv for Nagasaki, depending on location.[54]
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
In the spring of 1948, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) was established in accordance with a presidential directive from Harry S. Truman to the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council to conduct investigations of the late effects of radiation among the survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One of the early studies conducted by the ABCC was on the outcome of pregnancies occurring in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in a control city, Kure located 18 miles south from Hiroshima, to discern the conditions and outcomes related to radiation exposure. Some would say ABCC was not in a position to offer medical treatment to the survivors except in a research capacity. One author has claimed that the ABCC refused to provide medical treatment to the survivors for better research results.[55] In 1975, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation was created to assume the responsibilities of ABCC.
The Hibakusha
The survivors of the bombings are called Hibakusha (被爆者, Hibakusha?), a Japanese word that literally translates to "explosion-affected people". The suffering of the bombing is the root of Japan's postwar pacifism, and the nation has sought the abolition of nuclear weapons from the world ever since. As of 2005, there are about 266,000 hibakusha still living in Japan.[56]
Korean survivors
During the war Japan brought many Korean conscripts to both Hiroshima and Nagasaki to work as forced labor. According to recent estimates, about 20,000 Koreans were killed in Hiroshima and about 2,000 died in Nagasaki. It is estimated that one in seven of the Hiroshima victims was of Korean ancestry.[57] For many years Koreans had a difficult time fighting for recognition as atomic bomb victims and were denied health benefits.[citation needed] Though such issues have been addressed in recent years, issues regarding recognition lingers.[citation needed]
Debate over bombings
Support
Preferable to invasion
Those who argue in favor of the decision to drop the bombs generally assert that the bombings ended the war months sooner than would otherwise have been the case, thus saving many lives. It is argued that there would have been massive casualties on both sides in the impending Operation Downfall invasion of Japan,[58] and that even if Operation Downfall was postponed, the status quo of conventional bombings and the Japanese occupations in Asia were causing tremendous loss of life.
The Americans anticipated losing many soldiers in the planned invasion of Japan, although the actual number of expected fatalities and wounded is subject to some debate. It depends on the persistence and reliability of Japanese resistance, and whether the Allies would have invaded only Kyūshū in November 1945 or if a follow up Allied landing near Tokyo, projected for March 1946, would have been needed. Years after the war, Secretary of State James Byrnes claimed that 500,000 American lives would have been lost, however in the summer of 1945,[citation needed] U.S. military planners projected 20,000–110,000 combat deaths from the initial November 1945 invasion, with about three to four times that number wounded.[citation needed] (Total U.S. killed in action on all fronts in World War II in nearly four years of war was 292,000.[11])
Japan chose not to surrender
A nation historically suspicious of Western imperialism, Japanese military officials were opposed to any negotiations before the use of the atomic bomb and favored a ceasefire over any sort of concession or surrender.[59] The rise of Japanese militarism in the wake of the Great Depression had resulted in countless assassinations of reformers attempting to check military power, such as those of Takahashi Korekiyo, Saitō Makoto, and Inukai Tsuyoshi, creating an environment in which opposition to war was itself a risky endeavor.[60]
While some members of the civilian leadership did use covert diplomatic channels to attempt peace negotiation, they could not negotiate surrender or even a cease-fire. Japan, as a Constitutional Monarchy, could only legally enter into a peace agreement with the unanimous support of the Japanese cabinet, and in the summer of 1945, the Japanese Supreme War Council, consisting of representatives of the Army, the Navy and the civilian government, could not reach a consensus on how to proceed.[60]
A political stalemate developed between the military and civilian leaders of Japan, the military increasingly determined to fight despite all costs and odds and the civilian leadership seeking a way to negotiate an end to the war. Further complicating the decision was the fact that no cabinet could exist without the representative of the Imperial Japanese Army. This meant that the Army and the Navy could veto any decision by having its Minister resign, thus making it the most powerful posts on the SWC. In early August of 1945 the cabinet was equally split between those who advocated an end to the war on one condition, the preservation of the Kokutai, and those who insisted on three other conditions : leave disarmament and demobilization to Imperial General Headquarters, no occupation and delegation to Japanese government of the punishment of war criminals[61] The "hawks" consisted of General Korechika Anami, General Yoshijiro Umezu and Admiral Soemu Toyoda and were led by Anami. The "doves" consisted of Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Naval Minister Mitsumasa Yonai and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigenori Togo and were led by Togo.[60] Under special permission of the emperor, the president of the Privy council, Kiichiro Hiranuma, was also member of the imperial conference. For him, the preservation of the Kokutai implied not only that of the Imperial institution but also the continuation of emperor Showa's reign.[62]
The "one condition" faction, led by Togo, seized on the bombing as decisive justification of surrender. Kōichi Kido, one of Emperor Hirohito's closest advisers, stated: "We of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our endeavor to end the war." Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief Cabinet secretary in 1945, called the bombing "a golden opportunity given by heaven for Japan to end the war."
Unable to reach consensus at the meetings of the 9th and 10th, the council appealed to the emperor. Once emperor Showa had chosen the "one condition" side, the cabinet reformulated the acceptance of allies ultimatum "with the understanding that the said declaration does not compromise any demand that prejudices the prerogatives of his Majesty as a sovereign ruler".[63]
In justifying himself in 1946, Hirohito explain he though it was "impossible to continue the war. I had been informed by the chief of staff of the Army that the defenses of Cape Inubo and the Kujukuri coastal plain were still not ready. Also, according to the Army minister, the matériel needed to complete arming the divisions that would fight the final battle in the Kanto region could not be delivered until September...The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we did not act, the Japanese race would perish...There would be no time to protect the sacred treasures of the imperial family...Under these circumstances, protection of the Kokutai would be difficult."[64]
Speedy end of war saved lives
Supporters of the bombing also point out that waiting for the Japanese to surrender was not a cost-free option—as a result of the war, noncombatants were dying throughout Asia at a rate of about 200,000 per month.[citation needed] Firebombing had killed well over 100,000 people in Japan since February of 1945, directly and indirectly. That intensive conventional bombing would have continued prior to an invasion. The submarine blockade and the United States Army Air Forces's mining operation, Operation Starvation, had effectively cut off Japan's imports. A complementary operation against Japan's railways was about to begin, isolating the cities of southern Honshū from the food grown elsewhere in the Home Islands. "Immediately after the defeat, some estimated that 10 million people were likely to starve to death," noted historian Daikichi Irokawa. Meanwhile, in addition to the Soviet attacks, fighting continued in The Philippines, New Guinea and Borneo, and offensives were scheduled for September in southern China and Malaya.
The atomic bomb hastened the end of the war, liberating millions in occupied areas, including thousands of interned civilians and prisoners of war from Japanese camps. For example, in the case of the Dutch East Indies, these included about 200,000 Dutch and 400,000 Indonesians romusha (slave laborers). In Java alone, between four and 10 million romusha were forced to work by the Japanese military.[65] About 270,000 Javanese romusha were sent to other Japanese-held areas in South East Asia. Only 52,000 were repatriated to Java, meaning that there was a death rate of 80%.
Moreover, Japanese troops had committed atrocities against millions of civilians, by means including the sanko sakusen ("scorched earth") policies, the infamous Nanking Massacre and the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the early end to the war prevented further bloodshed. Millions of Asian civilians died of famine under Japanese rule: for example, a UN report states that four million people died in the Dutch East Indies as a result of famine and forced labor during the Japanese occupation, including 30,000 European civilian internee deaths.[66] These war crimes were ongoing, and use of the atomic bombs brought them to an abrupt end.
Philippine justice Delfin Jaranillla, member of the Tokyo tribunal, wrote in his judgement:
"If a means is justified by an end, the use of the atomic bomb was justified for it brought Japan to her knees and ended the horrible war. If the war had gone longer, without the use of the atomic bomb, how many thousands and thousands of helpless men, women and children would have needlessely died and suffer ...?[67]
Supporters also point to an order given by the Japanese War Ministry on August 1, 1944, ordering the disposal and execution of all Allied POWs, numbering over 100,000, if an invasion of the Japanese mainland took place.[68]
Part of "total war"
Supporters of the bombings have argued that the Japanese government waged total war, ordering many civilians (including women and children) to work in factories and military offices and to fight against any invading force. Father John A. Siemes, professor of modern philosophy at Tokyo's Catholic University, and an eyewitness to the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima wrote:
"We have discussed among ourselves the ethics of the use of the bomb. Some consider it in the same category as poison gas and were against its use on a civil population. Others were of the view that in total war, as carried on in Japan, there was no difference between civilians and soldiers, and that the bomb itself was an effective force tending to end the bloodshed, warning Japan to surrender and thus to avoid total destruction. It seems logical to me that he who supports total war in principle cannot complain of war against civilians."[69]
On June 30, 2007, Japan's first defense minister Fumio Kyuma said the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan by the United States during World War II was an inevitable way to end the war. Kyuma said "I now have come to accept in my mind that in order to end the war, it could not be helped that an atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki and that countless numbers of people suffered great tragedy." Mr.Fumio Kyuma, who is from Nagasaki, said the bombing caused great suffering in the city, but he does not resent the U.S. because it prevented the Soviet Union from entering the war with Japan.[70] Nagasaki mayor Tomihisa Taue protested against Kyuma.
In the wake of the outrage provoked by his statements, Kyuma had to resign on July 3.[71] However, the comments of Kyuma were almost similar to those made by emperor Showa when, in his first ever press conference given in Tokyo in 1975, he was asked what he thought of the bombing of Hiroshima. Hirohito then answered : "It's very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima but it couldn't be helped because that happened in wartime."[72]
Some supporters of the bombings have emphasized the strategic significance of Hiroshima, as the Japanese 2nd army's headquarters, and of Nagasaki, as a major munitions manufacturing center.
In his speech to the Japanese people presenting his reasons for surrender, Emperor Hirohito referred specifically to the atomic bombs, stating that if they continued to fight it would result in "...an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation..."[73]
Opposition
Inherently immoral
A number of notable individuals and organizations have criticized the bombings, many of them characterizing them as war crimes or crime against humanity. Two early critics of the bombings were Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard, who had together spurred the first bomb research in 1939 with a jointly written letter to President Roosevelt. Szilard, who had gone on to play a major role in the Manhattan Project, argued:
"Let me say only this much to the moral issue involved: Suppose Germany had developed two bombs before we had any bombs. And suppose Germany had dropped one bomb, say, on Rochester and the other on Buffalo, and then having run out of bombs she would have lost the war. Can anyone doubt that we would then have defined the dropping of atomic bombs on cities as a war crime, and that we would have sentenced the Germans who were guilty of this crime to death at Nuremberg and hanged them?"[74]
A number of scientists who worked on the bomb were against its use. Led by Dr. James Franck, seven scientists submitted a report to the Interim Committee (which advised the President) in May 1945, saying:
"If the United States were to be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons."[75]
On August 8, 1945, Albert Camus addressed the bombing of Hiroshima in an editorial in the French newspaper Combat:
"Mechanized civilization has just reached the ultimate stage of barbarism. In a near future, we will have to choose between mass suicide and intelligent use of scientific conquests[...] This can no longer be simply a prayer; it must become an order which goes upward from the peoples to the governments, an order to make a definitive choice between hell and reason."[76]
In 1946, a report by the Federal Council of Churches entitled Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith, includes the following passage:
"As American Christians, we are deeply penitent for the irresponsible use already made of the atomic bomb. We are agreed that, whatever be one's judgment of the war in principle, the surprise bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are morally indefensible."
In 1963 the bombings were the subject of a judicial review in Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State.[77] On the 22nd anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the District Court of Tokyo declined to rule on the legality of nuclear weapons in general, but found that "the attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused such severe and indiscriminate suffering that they did violate the most basic legal principles governing the conduct of war."[78]

In the opinion of the court, the act of dropping an atomic bomb on cities was at the time governed by international law found in the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907 and the Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare of 1922–1923[79] and was therefore illegal.[80]
As the first military use of nuclear weapons, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent to some the crossing of a crucial barrier. Peter Kuznick, director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University in Washington DC wrote of President Truman:
”He knew he was beginning the process of annihilation of the species. It was not just a war crime; it was a crime against humanity."[81]
Kurznick is one of several observers who believe that the U.S. was largely motivated in carrying out the bombings by a desire to demonstrate the power of its new weapon to the Soviet Union. Historian Mark Selden of Cornell University has stated "Impressing Russia was more important than ending the war in Japan."[81]
Takashi Hiraoka, mayor of Hiroshima, upholding nuclear disarmament, said in a hearing to The Hague International Court of Justice (ICJ):
"It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, which cause indiscriminate mass murder that leaves [effects on] survivors for decades, is a violation of international law".[82][83]
Iccho Itoh, the mayor of Nagasaki, declared in the same hearing:
"It is said that the descendants of the atomic bomb survivors will have to be monitored for several generations to clarify the genetic impact, which means that the descendants will live in anxiety for [decades] to come. [...] with their colossal power and capacity for slaughter and destruction, nuclear weapons make no distinction between combatants and non-combatants or between military installations and civilian communities [...] The use of nuclear weapons [...] therefore is a manifest infraction of international law."[82]
John Bolton, former US ambassador to the United Nations, used Hiroshima and Nagasaki as examples why the US should not adhere to the International Criminal Court (ICC):
"A fair reading of the treaty [the Rome Statute concerning the ICC], for example, leaves the objective observer unable to answer with confidence whether the United States was guilty of war crimes for its aerial bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan in World War II. Indeed, if anything, a straightforward reading of the language probably indicates that the court would find the United States guilty. A fortiori, these provisions seem to imply that the United States would have been guilty of a war crime for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is intolerable and unacceptable."[84]
Although bombings do not meet the definition of genocide, some consider that this definition is too strict, and that these bombings do represent a genocide.[85][86] For example, University of Chicago historian Bruce Cumings states there is a consensus among historians to Martin Sherwin's statement, that "the Nagasaki bomb was gratuitous at best and genocidal at worst."[87]
Historical accounts indicate that the decision to use the atomic bombs was made in order to provoke an early surrender of Japan by use of an awe-inspiring power. These observations have caused some commentators to state that the incident was an act of "war terrorism". Michael Walzer wrote, "... And, finally, there is war terrorism: the effort to kill civilians in such large numbers that their government is forced to surrender. Hiroshima seems to me the classic case."[88] This type of claim eventually prompted historian Robert Newman, a supporter of the bombings, to argue that the practice of terrorism is justified in some cases.[89]
Militarily unnecessary
Those who argue that the bombings were unnecessary on military grounds hold that Japan was already essentially defeated and ready to surrender.
One of the most notable individuals with this opinion was then-General Dwight D. Eisenhower. He wrote in his memoir The White House Years:
"In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives."[90][91]
Other U.S. military officers who disagreed with the necessity of the bombings include General Douglas MacArthur (the highest-ranking officer in the Pacific Theater), Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (the Chief of Staff to the President), General Carl Spaatz (commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific), Brigadier General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials),[91] Admiral Ernest King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard,[92] and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.[93]
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan." Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.[94]
"The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.[94]
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, after interviewing hundreds of Japanese civilian and military leaders after Japan surrendered, reported:
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."[95][94]

The survey assumed that conventional bombing attacks on Japan would greatly increase as the bombing capabilities of July 1945 were ...a fraction of its planned proportion...[96] due to a steadily high production rate of new B-29s and the reallocation of European airpower to the Pacific. When hostilities ended, the USAAF had approximately 3700 B-29s of which only about 1000 were deployed.[97]
Had the war gone on these and still more aircraft would have brought devastation far worse than either bomb to many more cities. The results of conventional strategic bombing at the cease-fire were summed up thusly:
"...On the basis of photo coverage, intelligence estimated that 175 square miles of urban area in 66 cities were wiped out. Total civilian casualties stemming directly from the urban attacks were estimated at 330,000 killed, 476,000 injured, and 9,200,000 rendered homeless." General Haywood S. Hansell[97]
General MacArthur has also contended that Japan would have surrendered before the bombings if the U.S. had notified Japan that it would accept a surrender that allowed Emperor Hirohito to keep his position as titular leader of Japan, a condition the U.S. did in fact allow after Japan surrendered. U.S. leadership knew this, through intercepts of encoded Japanese messages, but refused to clarify Washington's willingness to accept this condition. Before the bombings, the position of the Japanese leadership with regards to surrender was divided. Several diplomats favored surrender, while the leaders of the Japanese military voiced a commitment to fighting a "decisive battle" on Kyūshū, hoping that they could negotiate better terms for an armistice afterward. The Japanese government did not decide what terms, beyond preservation of an imperial system, they would have accepted to end the war; as late as August 9, the Supreme War Council was still split, with the hard-liners insisting Japan should demobilize its own forces, no war crimes trials would be conducted, and no occupation of Japan would be allowed. Only the direct intervention of the emperor ended the dispute, and even then a military coup was attempted to prevent the surrender.
Historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's research has led him to conclude that the atomic bombings themselves were not even the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, he contends, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories in Manchuria that forced the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.
------------xXx------------